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4- CHAPTER I ♦
From Helplessness to Hope:
The Seminal Career of Martin Seligman
Steven F. Maier, Christopher Peterson, and Barry Schwartz
T
his book explores a specific field of psychological research, but 
it also celebrates the profound contributions to this field of 
Martin E. P. Seligman. Therefore, the book blends the history 
of this research enterprise and Seligman’s own intellectual history. This 
chapter reviews the modest origins of the phenomenon of “learned 
helplessness” in the animal laboratory, its extensions to human beings 
(especially those displaying dramatic failures of adaptation), and its even­
tual emergence as “learned optimism.” The remainder of the book doc­
uments two major themes. First, the insights arising out of research on 
learned helplessness have been extended to almost every domain of 
modern psychology. And second, Seligman has played a significant role 
in almost all of these extensions. In fact, this book makes a fitting trib­
ute to the man whose fingerprints appear on every chapter.
Although the research discussed in this book focuses on optimism 
and hope, the research story does not begin there. Rather, it begins with 
the opposite end of the pole—helplessness. As will become apparent, 
Seligman is now a strong proponent of the development of a positive 
psychology, but the historic, intellectual seeds of the view that under- 
hes this new emphasis are very much in negative psychology. The crit­
ical first step in thinking that made this development possible was an 
appreciation of the negative consequences of the inability to control 
important environmental events. It is this inability that produces the 
learned helplessness phenomenon.
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The history of research on learned helplessness and learned optimism 
as well as Sehgman s own involvement in these areas reflects a large ele­
ment of chance. Furthermore, the development of research in this area 
also illustrates two other important lessons in how science actually pro­
ceeds. First, it is often difficult to predict at the outset where research 
will lead. Work on learned helplessness began in the animal laboratory 
and for several years was directed at deep theoretical issues in the psy­
chology of learning and not at depression, academic achievement, and 
other significant human phenomena. And second, the history of learned 
helplessness research demonstrates the continuity between basic and 
applied research in the way that it has moved effortlessly between fun­
damental issues in learning, cognition, and motivation on the one hand, 
and attempts to deal with problems of human adaptation and obstacles 
to the achievement of human potential on the other.
LEARNED HELPLESSNESS IN ANIMALS
Early Experiments
Learned helplessness research, and Seligman’s own work, began in the 
mid-1960s in the animal learning laboratory of Richard L. Solomon at 
the University of Pennsylvania. At that time, the focus in the Solomon 
laboratory was on the rigorous testing of a new theory designed to 
explain the occurrence of avoidance learning. In avoidance learning, 
some warning signal (e.g., a light) precedes the onset of an aversive 
stimulus (e.g., a shock) by a short period of time (e.g., ten seconds). A 
response by the animal (e.g., jumping a hurdle) after the aversive event 
has started enables it to escape the aversive stimulus. And a response 
during the warning signal enables it to avoid the aversive event.
Animals readily learn to make avoidance responses in such experi­
ments, and this fact created a significant theoretical puzzle. According 
to the dominant theories of the day, for a response to be learned, some 
event had to occur that reinforced it. The reinforcer for escape responses 
was obvious—termination of shock. But what was the reinforcer for 
avoidance responses? This also seems obvious—the absence of shock. 
But not so fast. If the absence of shock is a reinforcer, then why doesn’t
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it reinforce everything an animal does? After aU, before the experiment, 
the animal went through its life seeking food, grooming, sleeping, 
exploring, and each of these behaviors was accompanied by the absence 
of shock. While this sort of account is clearly absurd, it demonstrates 
why calling the absence of shock a reinforcer is problematic. If the 
absence of shock constitutes a reinforcer in the avoidance experiment, 
it must be because the shock is otherwise expected. This account makes 
obvious sense. The animal expects something (shock) to happen if it 
doesn’t respond. So it responds, thereby preventing the “expected” 
event. It is thus the absence of this expected aversive event that is the 
reinforcer of avoidance.
For researchers and theorists of the day, dominated as they were by 
the principles of behaviorism, the problem with this account was that 
a major aim of their enterprise was to explain behavior without having 
to appeal to mental entities like “expectations.” Solomon and his stu­
dents typified this enterprise and developed a theory—two-process the­
ory—to do that job for avoidance learning. The theory argued that fear 
becomes classically conditioned (Process i) to the warning signal on 
the early trials before the animal has learned to jump the hurdle. The 
warning signal and the shock are paired together in Pavlovian fashion 
on those trials. Avoidance responses do not occur until later trials, and 
when they do, they escape the fear-provoking warning signal (Process 2) 
and are followed by a rapid reduction in conditioned fear. The theory 
thus maintained that the animal does not really learn to “avoid” the 
aversive event. Rather, the so-called “avoidance” response is really an 
escape response; the animal, motivated by conditioned fear produced by 
the warning signal, escapes this fear.
Solomon and his students attempted to test this explanation of avoid­
ance learning with what was called a “transfer of control” experiment, 
in which the intention was to conduct straightforward classical condi­
tioning of fear by pairing a neutral stimulus (e.g., a light) with an aver­
sive stimulus. Then, in a different environment, avoidance learning 
would be conducted using some other stimulus (e.g., a tone) as the 
warning signal. After the avoidance response was weU established and 
the animal was responding reliably to the tone, the crucial third phase 
of the experiment would be conducted. The light would be turned on
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during the avoidance procedure, and the question was whether the ani­
mal would now perform the avoidance response, even though the light 
had never been used as a warning signal in the avoidance apparatus.
This was a key prediction made by two-process theory: If “avoid­
ance” responding was really “escape” from a fear-provoking warning 
signal, then any time you presented such a signal, it ought to trigger the 
already learned avoidance response. However, when Leaf and Over- 
mier, graduate students in the Solomon laboratory, set out to test the 
prediction, they had difficulty in conducting the experiment. The prob­
lem was that when, after classical conditioning of fear had been estab­
lished, the animals were exposed to an avoidance procedure, they often 
failed to learn to avoid shock. Indeed, they often failed even to learn to 
escape shock (Overmier, 1968; Overmier and Leaf, 1965). This was quite 
surprising given that such tasks are typically learned rapidly.
Because having learned to avoid shock was a precondition for test­
ing this key prediction, the prediction could not be tested. The solution 
to the problem, as it turned out, was to reverse phases i and 2 and con­
duct the avoidance training first and the classical conditioning second. 
This was indeed done, and the testing of two-process theory proceeded 
successfully. It seemed that somehow the prior occurrence of classical 
conditioning interfered with the learning of the instrumental escape 
and avoidance responses.
For researchers committed to rigorous testing of two-process the­
ory, this peculiar, accidentally discovered order effect was largely a 
methodological nuisance. However, another graduate student in the 
Solomon laboratory (Seligman), and a graduate student in Henry Gleit- 
man’s laboratory, which was right next door (Maier), thought that the 
“nuisance” deserved study in its own right and might even be more 
interesting than the theory that was being tested. The question was 
what was it about the shock animals received during classical condi­
tioning that interfered with subsequent learning?
It is the very defining feature of classical conditioning that the behav­
ior of the subject has no impact on the occurrence of the uncondi­
tioned stimulus (the UCS) or its properties. Could this have been 
important? This question led to what is arguably the single most impor­
tant experiment in the entire literature concerning helplessness and
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optimism. Overmier and Seligman (1967) first gave animals a series of 
either escapable shocks—shocks that could be terminated by a 
response—or exacdy matched but inescapable shocks, as in classical con­
ditioning. The animals were later tested for escape and avoidance learn­
ing in a different apparatus. It turned out that the animals that had 
initially received escapable shock learned normally, while those that had 
initially received physically identical inescapable shocks failed to learn. 
This demonstration was quickly followed by experiments in which it 
was found that an experience of escapable shock “immunized” animals 
so that a later exposure to inescapable shock was without effect on later 
learning (Seligman and Maier, 1967), and ideas about control, helpless­
ness, and optimism were born.
Learned Helplessness Theory
Why should inescapable shock interfere with later learning? The process 
of attempting to answer this question became a crossroads for Seligman 
and Maier. Explanatory concepts existed within the behaviorist theo­
ries that dominated the 1960s that could provide an “explanation” (e.g., 
BraceweU and Black, 1974). However, the explanation seemed contorted 
and inelegant, and seemed to trivialize the phenomenon. If one added 
to this a growing disenchantment with the pinched behaviorist theo­
ries of the time, as well as two personalities who wanted to “push the 
envelope,” it was over-determined that a new theory would be devel­
oped.
Sehgman and Maier reasoned that it must be something about what 
the animal learned about inescapable shock that was critical, rather than 
the shock per se, because inescapable and escapable shocks were phys­
ically identical, yet had drastically different effects. What could the ani­
mals be learning? Sehgman and Maier together pondered this seemingly 
easy-to-answer question for months, consulted scholars in various dis­
ciplines, and could not come up with a meaningful answer within the 
context of learning theory. Presumably, the key was that the shock was 
inescapable. But what did that really mean? How can that fact about 
shock be learned? This question obviously does not seem difficult now, 
and probably would not have seemed all that difficult back then, to
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someone not fortunate enough to have been immersed in the learning 
theories of the day. However, Seligman and Maier were immersed in 
those theories. And those theories emphasized what might be called 
“magic moments” of temporal conjunction of conditioned stimulus 
and unconditioned stimulus, response and reinforcer. The language of 
“control” and “lack of control” that seems so natural today was com­
pletely absent in the 1960s and early 1970s. An organism could never 
learn about lack of control if it were locked into processing the world 
as a series of these magic moments.
Influenced by some revolutionary experiments and ideas coming 
from another lab mate (e.g., Rescorla, 1967), Sehgman and Maier ulti­
mately reasoned that the animal must be learning that responding and 
shock termination are independent. This required that organisms be sen­
sitive to the probability of an outcome (e.g., shock termination) given 
that they had made some response, to the probability of the outcome 
given that they had not made that response, and to the relation between 
these two probabilities. Act and outcome were independent when these 
two probabilities were equal, and Seligman and Maier argued that this 
is what the animal learns about inescapable shock—that shock termi­
nation is independent of voluntary responses.
It was not long before Seligman and Maier realized that the com­
parison of these two probabilities defined a dimension that could be 
called “behavioral control over environmental events.” Learning about 
this dimension—the “computing” of probabilities—is quite far removed 
from the “magic moments” of earlier theories. However, this still did 
not explain why animals exposed to inescapable shock later fail to learn 
to escape. Seligman and Maier argued that the learning that shock ter­
mination is independent of behavior has two major consequences. First, 
this learning interferes with the subsequent formation of associations 
between the escape response and shock termination. Second, this learn­
ing undermines the motivation to attempt to escape. This entire set of 
conjectures was first published in a chapter by Maier, Seligman, and 
Solomon (1969) and was collectively called the learned helplessness 
hypothesis.
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Research from 19^0—1985
Animal research on learned helplessness in the next 10—15 years went in 
two different directions. The first one focused on the behavioral phe­
nomenon itself and revolved around its generality and limits. Was the 
interference with escape learning produced by inescapable shock 
restricted to escaping shock, or would the organism also fail to escape 
other aversive events? Would an inescapable event other than electric 
shock produce the same phenomenon? Did uncontrollable aversive 
events affect aspects of behavior other than escape learning? Did uncon­
trollable positive events produce analogous outcomes? How long did 
the effects persist? What was the range of species that showed helpless­
ness phenomena? Could helplessness be demonstrated in humans? 
Questions such as these were addressed by a growing number of inves­
tigators, and answers to these questions indicated that the phenomenon 
was quite robust and general (see Maier and Sehgman, 1976).
The second direction concentrated on theory testing. The learned 
helplessness theory initially not only met with great resistance but also 
generated quite a controversy. This should be no surprise since the 
assumptions about the nature of the learning process made by the the­
ory were opposed to the ideas that were then dominant. In addition to 
criticizing the ideas involved in the theory of learned helplessness, oppo­
nents suggested alternative explanations of the basic interference with 
escape learning produced by inescapable shock. There were two cate­
gories of alternative theories. One category was behavioral. As a class, 
these theories argued that exposure to inescapable shock taught organ­
isms some response that interfered with the one they were later required 
to learn. The second category was neurochemical, derived from some 
pioneering work by Weiss (Weiss, 1968; Weiss, Stone, & Harrell, 1970). 
These theories argued that inescapable shock depleted a neurotrans- 
mitter, typically norepinephrine, that was necessary for the mediation of 
movement. Therefore, helplessness was not the result of an interference 
with learning per se, but rather it was the result of neurochemically 
based movement impairment. What the behavioral and neurochemical 
accounts have in common is an appeal to peripheral (movement based) 
rather than central (learning based) mechanisms to explain interference.
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The idea that the learned helplessness phenomenon could be 
explained by the learning of interfering motor responses was relatively 
easy to disprove (Maier, 1970). However, the neurochemical depletion 
and movement deficit ideas were more challenging. It became clear that 
animals that had been exposed to uncontrollable aversive events did later 
move less in the presence of aversive events than did other animals. 
However, this could be explained readily by both theories. Reduced 
motivation to escape consequent to learning uncontrollability, as well as 
depletion of transmitters required for movement, would predict reduced 
movement.
The difference between the views thus came to be focused on 
whether or not there was a true interference with associative processes, 
as well as a reduction in movement, following exposure to uncontrol­
lable aversive events. The difficulty was that the learning tasks used in 
learned helplessness experiments confounded poor learning with 
reduced movement. That is, all the tasks that had been used required 
active motor output (e.g., jumping over the hurdle) as the index of 
learning. A series of experiments attempted to resolve this issue by 
assessing learning in tasks in which there was either no correlation (Jack- 
son, Alexander, & Maier, 1980), or even a negative correlation between 
learning and movement (Minor, Jackson, & Maier, 1984)- In the latter 
category of study, the behavior needed to escape was the withholding of 
an active motor response, and animals previously exposed to uncon­
trollable stressors continued to emit this active motor response, thereby 
failing to learn to escape. Here, failure to learn was reflected in greater 
movement rather than reduced movement.
Synthesis
Despite this research, there still were numerous difficulties for learned 
helplessness theory. First, even at the level of psychological theory, 
learned helplessness was vague concerning the mechanism by which 
uncontrollable stressors produce later associative interference. Exactly 
what was interfered with? Second, despite the existence of a true asso­
ciative interference, movement per se was nevertheless often still 
reduced. Third, learned helplessness theory had no satisfactory expla-
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nation for many of the behavioral effects of uncontrollable stressors that 
occurred in addition to interference with escape learning. Why should 
uncontrollable stressors reduce aggressiveness, interfere with maternal 
behavior, exaggerate fear conditioning, reduce food and water intake, 
and increase responsiveness to opiate drugs such as morphine? The Ust 
of consequences of uncontrollable stressors is long, and reduced incen­
tive to escape and associative interference can not explain all, or even 
most of them.
Purely behavioral research continues to make progress on the nature 
of the alterations in associative processes that are produced by exposure 
to uncontrollable stressors. The bulk of the evidence suggests that expo­
sure to uncontrollable stressors produces an attentional shift away from 
“internal,” response-produced cues and toward external cues (Lee & 
Maier, 1988). This might suggest that uncontrollable stressors produce a 
change in learning style, not a deficit per se. Indeed, it might be 
expected that uncontrollably stressed organisms would learn better than 
normals in tasks requiring detailed attention to external cues, and this 
is actually the case (Lee & Maier, 1988).
However, purely behavioral research has not been able to provide 
much insight into how uncontrollable stressors alter other types of 
behavior. Here, neuroscience and neurochemistry have been able to 
provide great advances. A number of investigators have elucidated the 
neural and neurochemical consequences of uncontrollability in fine 
detail (e.g., Anisman, Zalcman, Shanks, & Kacharko, 1991; Maswood, 
Barter, Watkins, & Maier, 1998; Petty, Kramer, & Moeller, 1994; Simson 
& Weiss, 1988). The tremendous explosion of knowledge concerning 
how the brain works and how it regulates behavior has made it possi­
ble to tie the neurochemical consequences of uncontroUability to the 
behavioral consequences that occur. It is now possible, for example, to 
state why uncontrollable stressors reduce aggressiveness rather than 
increase it, why they increase fear, and so on. Indeed, a knowledge of the 
underlying neurocircuitry has allowed a priori prediction of new, unex­
plored consequences of uncontroUability. For example, from what is 
known about neurocircuitry, one can make the counter-intuitive pre­
diction that uncontroUably stressed animals wiU find opiate drugs, but 
not stimulants, more rewarding and addictive than normal animals (WiU,
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Watkins, and Maier, 1998). Such a prediction would be unlikely based 
on purely behavioral knowledge.
Future Directions
The powerful techniques now available to researchers in the neuro­
sciences, added to rapidly accumulating detailed knowledge, suggest that 
animal research in the foreseeable future will be focused at the neuro- 
biological level. This neurobiological emphasis is also related to the 
medical need to develop animal models of pathology. Effective bio­
medical research requires animal models, and the neurobiological work 
on learned helplessness indicates that it may be an especially useful 
model of a number of psychopathologies (e.g., Basoglu & Mineka, 
1992). The fact that learned helplessness in animals has been proposed 
as a model of a number of different disorders should not be disturbing. 
Disorders such as depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and the like 
are syndromal nosological categories, not biological entities. A given 
biological phenomenon, like learned helplessness, could be common 
to a number of disorders. Furthermore, it could reveal the common 
core cause of a diversity of pathologies. It is a real testimony to the 
power and importance of basic research and theory to realize that these 
broad and exciting new directions, full of potential significance for 
application, have flowed from the accidental discovery that dogs with a 
certain history were unable to learn what for other dogs was a trivial 
task. But it should also be clear that for progress to be made, “accidents” 
like this have to happen to the right people, and Seligman is such a 
person.
LEARNED HELPLESSNESS IN HUMANS
Mapping the behavioral scope of learned helplessness in animals, artic­
ulating the theory, and defending it against the many challenges that 
arose would have been more than enough to keep even the most ener­
getic scientist busy for years—but not Seligman. For as the develop­
ments just described were unfolding, Seligman was also taking the
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helplessness phenomenon in an entirely different direction, by asking 
about its scope and character in human beings.
The earliest studies of human helplessness were stricdy analogous to 
those done with animals, exposing human research participants to aver­
sive events—typically bursts of white noise—that could neither be 
escaped nor avoided. Participants were then tested on tasks that could be 
mastered, for example, unscrambling anagrams. And just as with ani­
mals, the reliable finding was that relative to individuals who either had 
no previous experimental experience, or experience with controllable 
events, those who had experienced uncontrollability often showed 
deficits, including negative affect, slower problem-solving, more failures 
to master tasks, and perseveration with unproductive strategies.
One of the most widely cited papers from this early era of human 
helplessness research was by Seligman and Hiroto (Hiroto & Seligman, 
1975), which reported four parallel studies testing the transfer of help­
lessness deficits from one sort of pretreatment to a second sort of test 
task. Two pretreatment tasks were used, an “instrumental” pretreatment, 
in which participants had to press buttons to terminate a noise, and a 
“cognitive” pretreatment, in which participants had to solve concept- 
identification problems. Two test tasks were used, one “instrumental” 
(moving a lever to escape or avoid a noise) and the other “cognitive” 
(unscrambling anagrams). The four studies were made up of all possi­
ble combinations of the pretreatments and test tasks.
It was hardly surprising that deficits were evident when the test tasks 
were similar to the pretreatments; these results would be predicted by 
almost any theory. More interesting were the findings that deficits were 
also evident when the test tasks and the pretreatments were dissimilar. 
Using jargon popular at the time, Hiroto and Seligman concluded that 
“cross-modal helplessness” had been produced and that this was strong 
support for the theory that helplessness involved learning that one did 
not have control over events.
In retrospect, the distinction between “instrumental” and “cognitive” 
pretreatments and test tasks may seem artificial, but it provides a useful 
reminder that Hiroto and Seligman did their experiments at a time 
when there was still broad skepticism in the field about the necessity or 
utility of mentalistic accounts of behavior that relied on things like
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“expectations.” The cognitive revolution was still being fought, and 
behaviorism had yet to surrender. The investigation of learned help­
lessness, among humans as well as animals, was one of the important bat­
tlegrounds.
Perhaps because helplessness theory was fighting a rear-guard action 
against behaviorism, the early research in helplessness paid scant atten­
tion to the detailed development of helplessness theory as an alternative. 
The original helplessness story was a very simple, straightforward 
account of how experience with uncontrollable events produces sub­
sequent deficits. Helplessness theory argued that uncontrollable events 
produce an expectation of response-outcome independence, which in 
turn produces a variety of deficits, and left it at that. Introducing the 
construct of “expectation” was a sufficient departure from prevailing 
theory that researchers did not scrutinize this construct until some time 
later. Indeed, very few early studies even tried to measure expectations, 
despite the central role they were accorded in helplessness theory. Ani­
mals, of course, cannot directly report on what they expect. But people 
can. Yet, perhaps because helplessness theory was firmly grounded in the 
animal learning tradition, the earliest investigators of human helplessness 
did not turn immediately to such contemporary theoretical frames as 
Rotters social learning theory (1954). Rotter (1966,1975) wrote exten­
sively about generalized expectancies (such as locus of control and inter­
personal trust) and provided means with which to investigate them.
Cronbach (1957) distinguished between two traditions of scientific 
psychology—an experimental tradition, emphasizing external objective 
events and their effects on behavior, and a correlational tradition, 
emphasizing internal subjective events and their effects. Cronbach called 
for the unification of these traditions, acknowledging that it would be 
difficult to do so. Researchers in each tradition not only ask different 
questions about behavior, but also use different research and analytical 
strategies. SeUgman led other helplessness researchers to bridge the gap 
described by Cronbach when he asked whether the helplessness phe­
nomenon, as produced in animal and human laboratories, was similar to 
certain failures of human adaptation.
The best-known of these apphcations was Seligman’s proposal that 
learned helplessness played a causal role in depression (1974, I975)-
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Though animal models of psychopathology had been around at least 
since the time of Pavlov, SeHgman significantly advanced such efforts by 
specifying expHcitly a set of rigorous ground rules for establishing the 
goodness of a laboratory model (e.g., Miller, Rosellini, & Seligman, 
1977). According to Seligman, it was critical that researchers move back 
and forth between the model and the clinical phenomenon, evaluating 
the parallels vis-a-vis symptoms, causes, treatments, and preventions. 
Even today, some researchers touting animal models of various mal­
adies, psychological and physical, do not sufficiently validate their mod­
els against the actual clinical phenomena they purport to clarify. A wry 
comment by Judah Folkman, the laboratory researcher whose studies of 
a possible new type of cancer treatment received massive pubhcity in the 
spring of 1998, exemplifies this well: “We know a great deal about how 
to cure cancer in mice.” In contrast, SeUgman knows a great deal about 
helplessness and its consequences in dogs, rats, and human beings.
Helplessness and Attributional Style
A major turning point in the development of research and theory on 
human helplessness came in 1978, when Seligman, in collaboration with 
Abramson and Teasdale, published a revised theory of helplessness and 
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). The new theory 
incorporated ideas from attribution theory, which for years had been the 
private domain of social psychology. From this point forward, simple 
claims about the relation among experience, expectations, and behav­
ior were replaced by efforts designed to detail the processes by which 
expectations were formed. The revised theory started with an attempt 
to make sense of some anomalous data. As researchers investigated par­
allels between learned helplessness on the one hand and failures of adap­
tation like depression on the other, it became clear that problems like 
depression were more complex than the helplessness theory allowed. 
Sometimes human helplessness following uncontroUabdity was chronic; 
other times, it was transient. Sometimes human helplessness was perva­
sive; other times, it was circumscribed. And sometimes human helpless­
ness was marked by a striking loss of self-esteem; other times, it was not. 
The original helplessness theory was silent regarding these variations.
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Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) revised the learned help­
lessness theory as it applied to people, and especially to depression, by 
proposing that when individuals encounter an uncontrollable aversive 
event, they ask themselves why. The answer people give to this ques­
tion—the causal attribution they entertain—sets the parameters for the 
helplessness that ensues. Three dimensions of causal attribution were 
claimed to be important. If the attributed cause were stable (“it’s going 
to last forever”) rather than unstable, then helplessness would be long- 
lasting. If it were global (“it’s going to undermine everything”) rather 
than specific, then helplessness would be general. And if the causal attri­
bution were internal (“it’s me”) rather than external, then helplessness 
would be accompanied by a loss of self-esteem. The pattern of causal 
attributions for a particular instance of uncontroUability would affect a 
person’s expectations for the future. And these expectations would in 
turn affect the person’s behavior.
Reality or social consensus may sometimes dictate the causal expla­
nation that a person embraces; but in more ambiguous circumstances, 
the individual relies on habitual tendencies to explain bad events in a 
given way, a personality characteristic described by Seligman as explana­
tory (or attributional) style (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Those people 
who tend to offer stable and global explanations for bad events are not 
only at risk for helplessness, but also for the failures of adaptation in 
which helplessness figures in the wake of uncontroUability. Those peo­
ple who tend to offer internal explanations for bad events are at risk for 
self-esteem loss in the wake of uncontroUability.
This revised account of learned helplessness—the attributional refor­
mulation—is an explanation of human problems that presupposes that 
people are rational, acting “logicaUy” in accordance with their inter­
pretation of the causes of events. The rationality inherent in the 
processes proposed by the attributional reformulation of helplessness 
theory may be what aUows it to be used in the service of a positive psy­
chology. For this rationality can explain resiUence as readily as helpless­
ness, hope as weU as despair, and good cheer as weU as depression. It teUs 
us how to intervene to undo passivity as weU as how to prevent passivity 
in the first place. In aU cases, how a person thinks about the things he or 
she experiences is taken seriously. At the same time, it is important to
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stress that one of the potent determinants of explanatory style is reahty, 
so that interventions cannot be so simple as just urging people to “think 
positive” when the world in which they hve is relentlessly negative.
The attribution reformulation of helplessness theory is a diathesis- 
stress theory, proposing that the conjunction of objective bad events 
(the stress) and a pessimistic explanatory style (the diathesis) is necessary 
for negative behavioral outcomes to ensue. This position builds from the 
roots of the helplessness approach in the experimental psychology of 
animal learning, where bad events—the stress (e.g., uncontrollable elec­
tric shocks)—are presented to research participants. When guiding 
research with people, the attributional reformulation has usually focused 
on the cognitive diathesis, which proves a consistent correlate of 
expected outcomes.
When one of us (Peterson) originally went to the University of 
Pennsylvania in 1979 to work with Seligman, Sehgman supervised both 
a thriving animal laboratory and a thriving human laboratory. The attri­
butional reformulation of helplessness theory had just been proposed, 
an Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) to measure attributional 
style had been created, and the initial investigation of explanatory style 
had just been published (Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 
1979). Over the years, explanatory style research has become increasingly 
popular, and many ways to measure this individual difference variable 
are now available. The original Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peter­
son, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Sehgman, 1982) was 
expanded, to boost reliability (Peterson &ViUanova, 1988), and then 
simphfied (Dykema, Bergbower, Doctora, & Peterson, 1996), to facili­
tate use with general population samples. A Children’s ASQ with a 
forced choice format was developed by Kaslow and Tanenbaum (Sehg­
man, Peterson, Kaslow, Tanenbaum, Alloy, & Abramson, 1984) and then 
refined (Thompson, Kaslow, Weiss, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Forced- 
choice measures suitable for use with adults are in the process of being 
created (Reivich, 1995). A content analysis strategy dubbed the CAVE 
technique (Content Analysis ofVerbatim Explanations) was created that 
allowed pre-existing written or spoken material to be scored for explana­
tory style (Peterson, Schulman, CasteUon, & Sehgman, 1992). StiU other 
strategies have been reported, including ways to score Minnesota
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Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) responses (Colligan, OfFord, 
Malinchoc, Schulman, & Seligman, 1994) and Thematic Apperception 
Test (TAT) protocols (Peterson & Ulrey, 1994) for explanatory style.
In their monograph Learned Helplessness: A Theory for the Age of Per­
sonal Control, Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) took a step back 
from the details of current helplessness research and tried to account for 
its popularity. One of the reasons they cited was the availability of rel­
atively simple and straightforward methods for conducting helplessness 
research. The family of explanatory style measures just described exem­
plifies this point. Countless researchers have used one or another of 
these approaches to investigate the correlates of pessimistic versus opti­
mistic explanatory style. Some of this work has been theory-driven, for 
example, the several hundred investigations of explanatory style and 
depression (Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986). But other studies have 
been exploratory and opportunistic, such as Petersons investigations of 
explanatory style as a risk factor for traumatic injuries (see Chapter 8). 
In any case, explanatory style has emerged from its connection to help­
lessness as a personahty characteristic in its own right, one that is broadly 
associated with coping, adaptation, and well-being (Buchanan & SeHg- 
man, 1995).
Important questions about explanatory style remain, of course (Peter­
son, 1991). For example, what are the origins of explanatory style, espe­
cially its pessimistic manifestation? One can readily explain why a 
pessimistic style maintains itself, because of the vicious cycles it can set 
into motion, but why would anyone start out with this view of the 
causes of events? Here research has only begun to scratch the surface, 
but there are hints that the explanatory styles of parents and children 
converge (Seligman et al., 1984). Also, failure and trauma early in life 
seem to foreshadow pessimism later in hfe (Peterson, Maier, & SeHgman, 
1993). Finally, in a study of twins, Schulman, Keith, and Sehgman (1993) 
reported that explanatory style was moderately heritable. We should 
probably not interpret this to mean that there is a specific causal attri­
bution gene waiting to be discovered. However, some of the factors 
that lead to success or failure in life—intelligence, attractiveness, 
health, physical prowess, and the Hke—are indisputably heritable, and the
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experiences that they enable or block may well shape the individuals 
explanatory style.
Perhaps more important, especially for a future positive psychology 
of optimism and hope, is the question of how an optimistic explanatory 
style can be encouraged. Intervention studies by Seligman’s research 
group demonstrate that children can be taught with cognitive-behav­
ioral exercises to look at events in a more optimistic fashion, and that 
this instruction seems to have long-term benefits (see Chapter ii). And 
Beck’s cognitive therapy for depression has the effect of making pes­
simistic individuals more optimistic; changes in explanatory style seem 
to go in lock-step with symptom relief and may confer protection 
against the recurrence of depression (Seligman, Castellon, Cacciola, 
Schulman, Luborsky OUove, & Downing, 1988).
As the multiple available measures of explanatory style facilitate rapid 
progress, the downside of these measures could be premature preoccu­
pation with the particular constellation of attributional dimensions 
hypothesized by Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale in their reformula­
tion of helplessness theory. To be sure, the internality, stability, and glob- 
ality of causal attributions are important, but they are hardly the only 
attributional dimensions of potential interest (Weiner, 1986). There is no 
doubt that whether events are inside the skin or outside (internahty), 
whether they persist across time or not (stability), and whether they 
generalize across situations or not (globality) are key dimensions of the 
psychological universe. But the universe must have more key dimen­
sions than this. What are they?
For example, what about the controllability of events? One might 
think that perceived controllability should have been included as an 
additional dimension measured by the ASQ and its descendants, but 
the reformulation of helplessness theory—inspired as it was by data 
from controlled laboratory experiments—took it for granted that the 
controllabdity or uncontroUabiHty of events was objectively known, and 
not a part of experience open to interpretation and sensitive to indi­
vidual differences. As the revised theory is increasingly applied outside 
the laboratory, this neglect of controllability as a possible dimension of 
explanatory style becomes more and more unfortunate. For example.
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studies suggest that ostensible “pessimism” (internal, stable, and global 
causal explanations) concerning bad events seen as controllable may 
have desirable consequences (Sellers & Peterson, 1993), perhaps because 
they constitute an assertion that things can be different.
Similarly, what about the importance (e.g., magnitude or severity) of 
the events about which attributions are made? Again, the reformulation 
did not consider this parameter because in laboratory experiments the 
aversive events to which research participants were exposed were held 
constant. The earliest version of the ASQ did ask respondents to rate the 
importance of the hypothetical events that were presented, but these rat­
ings rarely proved interesting, perhaps because they did not span a broad 
enough range of possible importance.
This neglect of the importance of events in helplessness theory has 
recently been rectified. In their hopelessness theory of depression, 
Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989) made the importance of events 
a cornerstone in what has become the next major reformulation of 
helplessness theory. Stoplights and pollen counts are uncontrollable and 
aversive, but it is doubtful that depression is ever precipitated by these 
events, no matter how they are interpreted. They are simply not impor­
tant enough.
Along similar lines, the original ASQ dehberately included achieve­
ment-related and interpersonal types of events, under the assumption 
that explanatory style might show some domain specificity. Again, this 
distinction rarely proved interesting, largely because respondents treated 
these different sorts of events as very similar. But perhaps young adult 
college students in the United States, the typical participants in the ear­
liest studies of explanatory style, are likely to conflate achievement and 
interpersonal outcomes. Good grades and high salaries can boost one s 
social status, turning achievement into something social. And interper­
sonal success can be reflected by how many best friends one has, turn­
ing social circumstances into opportunities for achievement. As the 
attributional reformulation of helplessness is extended into other set­
tings—other age groups, other socioeconomic classes, and other cul­
tures—it would be wise to revisit the possibility that there are 
domain-specific explanatory styles. It is already clear, for example, that 
the internal versus external distinction can prove problematic when
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assessed in collectivist cultures, where the distinction between self (inter­
nal) and others (external) is not given the same significance that it has 
in the contemporary United States (cf. MiUer, 1984).
One of the interesting extensions of the attributional reformulation 
targets these other populations. The ASQ has been translated into a 
variety of languages, and investigators have begun to explore explana­
tory style in other cultures. To date, results are largely consistent with the 
findings from the United States. A pessimistic explanatory style has 
undesirable correlates, whereas an optimistic explanatory style has desir­
able ones. But this research has been oriented toward confirmation, and 
the possibility that the ASQ (and of course the accompanying attribu­
tional reformulation of helplessness) needs to be made more culturally 
appropriate has yet to be considered seriously. We anticipate that an 
exciting chapter in the learned helplessness tradition will be written 
when such cross-cultural investigations are begun in earnest.
What about the role of objective events? As psychologists in the 
learned helplessness tradition poise themselves to help develop a posi­
tive social science (Seligman, 1998), it is crucial that the role of reality 
be remembered. From the uncontrollable events that predispose people 
to helplessness to the actual causal texture of the world that (sometimes) 
dictates a particular type of causal attribution, the outcomes of interest 
to “positive” social scientists are as much influenced by what the situa­
tion does or does not afford as they are by attitudes of hope and opti­
mism. One would not want to stroll into Lebanon, Northern Ireland, 
the former Yugoslavia, or West Philadelphia and advise their residents 
simply to be more optimistic in their outlooks. A positive social sci­
ence needs to encourage appropriate changes in social conditions so 
that optimism can exist as a viable worldview.
CONCLUSION
This chapter tried to accomplish two things: provide a brief history, as 
background for the compelling contributions to this book, and estab­
lish a sense of the magnitude of Martin Seligman s contributions to 
date. It is true that much about helplessness and optimism still needs to
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be explored. Helplessness and its consequences are not as simple as peo­
ple once thought, and many details need to be worked out. Many big 
questions remain to be answered, and some big questions have yet to be 
asked. Nevertheless, what is already notable about the research spawned 
by learned helplessness, especially Seligman’s contributions to that 
research, is that they constitute a rare example of what Cronbach envi­
sioned forty years ago.
We suggest an informative exercise: Access PsycINFO or PsycLIT, 
and enter “au=Seligman, Martin E. P.” Your first thought may be “Oh, 
the E. P. stands for “ever publishing,” but the sheer number of articles 
that Seligman has had a hand in is not the point. Rather, look at the 
range of journals in which Seligman and his colleagues have published 
studies of learned helplessness, from Journal of Comparative and Physio­
logical Psychology to Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, from 
Journal of Experimental Psychology to Journal of Personality and Social Psy­
chology, from Behaviour Research and Therapy to Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, from American Psychologist to Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
from Psychology Today to Science. With Seligman taking the lead, the 
phenomenon of learned helplessness has produced research as broad in 
scope as is psychology itself.
To locate Seligman further in the broad history of psychology, we 
must also note that he is among the rare psychologists who has heeded 
the plea George MiUer (1969) made in his American Psychological 
Association Presidential speech to “give psychology away. Many seri­
ous researchers are reluctant to take their ideas to the general pubhc, but 
Seligman, the president of APA in 1998, has never been shy about doing 
so. His popular books are as laudable as his monographs and journal 
articles. They make difficult and important ideas accessible to untrained 
readers without oversimplifying or pandering to current fashion. The 
point is that Seligman has always had something worth giving away. 
His basic research has legitimized his popular presentations. At the same 
time, his writing for the general public has stimulated interest in basic 
research among several generations of academic psychologists, and it 
continues to do so.
Finally, as evidenced by this book and by Seligman’s other recent 
contributions (e.g., Seligman, 1998), Seligman is leading his many stu-
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dents and collaborators in the next major new direction—taking the 
insights gained from research on learned helplessness and putting them 
to use in creating a psychology that emphasizes the nurture of what is 
good rather than just the repair of what is broken. Seligman’s most 
recent endeavor is a call for psychology to be as focused on strength as 
weakness, as interested in building the best things in life as repairing 
the worst, and as concerned with making the hves of normal people ful­
filling as healing pathology. He dubs this “positive psychology,” and 
although his interest in this topic stems from decades of studying what 
can go wrong with the human condition, positive psychology represents 
a radical reframing of Seligman s research program.
To be sure, everything learned about helplessness and its relation to 
depression, failure, and illness informs our knowledge of the absence of 
these conditions (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993).But there is more 
to positive psychology than the study of what does not go wrong. The 
“neutral” points of the typical outcome measures in the learned help­
lessness research tradition signify not being depressed, not failing, and 
not being iU. To extend past findings beyond these neutral points and 
offer conclusions about emotional fulfillment, achievement, and well­
ness, positive psychologists must study not just independent variables that 
pertain to strength but also appropriate dependent variables. And differ­
ent questions must be posed by positive psychologists than have been 
asked by researchers who work within a disease or deficiency frame­
work. Possible topics of interest to positive psychology include hope, 
creativity, optimism, happiness, flow, courage, emotional intelHgence, 
giftedness, genius, future-mindedness, interpersonal skills, and honesty.
In approaching these topics, positive psychologists should heed cer­
tain lessons from past attempts to understand human strengths and skills. 
From the fate of humanistic psychology of the 1960s and 1970s, posi­
tive psychologists should learn the importance of relying on empirical 
research. Humanists were skeptical about the scientific method and 
what it could yield yet were unable to offer an alternative other than the 
unsupported assertion that people were good. In contrast, positive psy­
chologists must see both strength and weakness as authentic and as 
amenable to scientific understanding.
From the fate of past studies of creativity, positive psychologists should
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learn to keep an open mind about appropriate operational definitions 
of the topics of interest to them. Although self-report questionnaire 
measures are often useful and valid, not everything of interest to posi­
tive psychologists can be so assessed. Already we are seeing researchers 
searching for questionnaire measures of emotional intelligence (Schutte 
et ah, 1998),but there is good reason to suspect that these measures will 
need to be supplemented if not altogether replaced by more complex 
measures that rely on the observation of actual behavior (Davies, 
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998).
From the fate of intelligence testing throughout the twentieth cen­
tury, positive psychologists should learn several lessons as well. Desirable 
psychological states should not be reified; they should not be studied out 
of context; and they should not be used to rank order aU people along 
a single continuum. Most importantly, positive psychologists should not 
regard what is “right” about people as unalterable, the result of fortu­
itous genetic or environmental circumstances. Indeed, the central goal 
of positive psychology is to cultivate and encourage the good psycho­
logical life for all people. That would be a legacy worthy of Martin 
Seligman.
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